Did the financial viability of the fishery change?
Indicators: Landings | Revenue
- Non-whiting groundfish landings showed a declining trend from the 1980s up to the start of the baseline period and stabilized thereafter.
- Over the first five years of the Shorebased IFQ Program, the annual landings of non-whiting groundfish continued to be relatively stable despite the continuing downward trend in fleet size (Number of Active Vessels).
- Numerous interrelated factors contribute to the ongoing underutilization of the allocation for many non-whiting groundfish species. Government and industry have taken steps to improve annual catch limit (ACL) attainment rates since the catch share program began.
- Harvests by the shorebased Pacific whiting sector have grown in the last two decades, especially through the 1990s.
- Average annual landings of shorebased Pacific whiting during 2011-2015 were about 21 percent higher than the 2002–2010 average due to strong year classes that resulted in high ACLs.
- The proportion of the shorebased Pacific whiting allocation harvested was high during the first years of the Shorebased IFQ Program, but it fell substantially in 2014 and 2015 due to a combination of especially high allocations (Ratio of Catch to Quota and Annual Catch Limits), weak markets (Financial Viability of the Fishery: Revenues), and low catch rates that may have been caused by anomalous oceanographic conditions.
Interactive Chart Story
This indicator measures changes in groundfish landings that affect the financial viability of fishing operations participating in the catch share fishery.
In Their Own Words
Although some of the quantitative data analyzed for this indicator exhibited clear trends, it was challenging to discuss the relationships between observed data trends and implementation of the respective catch share programs, especially in the Northeast. The Measuring the Effects of Catch Shares project team believed that those stakeholders most involved in the fishery, either as active participants or as representatives of an involved coalition of participants (e.g., sector managers in the Northeast), would be able to provide insight and help to explain trends seen in the existing quantitative data. The following quotes were selected to illustrate some of those perspectives and highlight trends such as effects on small vessels, the effect of avoiding “choke stocks,” fleet diversification, and product quality. The individual quotes do not represent findings or conclusions for this indicator, nor do they represent a consensus across any category of participants.
“If you hit the vessel limit, that’s it. And the limits themselves were based on a projection of what the fleet had been doing at the time, so it was back in 2010, I guess. And I remember the head of a fishermen’s association assuring everybody that oh no, everybody is going to be within the limit, this takes into account what everybody’s fishing pattern has been. That was fine, except fishing patterns have changed. And we’re stuck with limits, and anytime you try to suggest changing the limits, you’re seen as the evil empire trying to come in and eat up all the poor small fisherman.”
“We used to call, and we still do, groundfish the bread and butter fishery. Now, the IFQ program has changed that to where you might run out of fish, and you’ve got to lease and borrow and trade to continue fishing. But if you’ve got a groundfish permit and a boat that’s of any size and you want to work, you can make a living in groundfish.”
“You could make a mistake before, and you’d have to throw over the fish. But at least you could keep fishing. Now if you make a mistake you’re shut down. So it’s actually taken some flexibility away.”
“And the way those overfished species were allocated was different than the way the other species were allocated. The other species were allocated on past history. The overfished species were allocated on recent history. So you have somebody with a permit which over the years has fished a lot of Dover sole, whatever. And in recent years, because of the avoidance of overfished species, he only has a tiny little bit of petrale sole. So now he’s got this huge quota of Dover sole, but no petrale sole to go with it. So the guy literally can’t fish.”
“Whatever you have the least amount of in your IFQ account is your restrictive fish. And it could be halibut. That’s what most people think. They’re usually not. In my case it’s yellow-eye. In somebody else’s case it’s black cod. Or somebody else’s case it’s other types of rockfish. It depends what species you have the least amount of, that becomes your most restrictive thing.”
“In my opinion, one of the worst things that we ever did was allow gear switching. It sounded great, but sablefish fetches a higher price pot-caught. So we allowed our sablefish to exit the trawl fishery—well, it’s technically still in the trawl fishery, but a guy can go fish pots and catch trawl sablefish. It created an inequality. They can get paid more for it, therefore they can bid more for it.”
“Gear switching really hasn’t worked the way they thought. What it’s done is let the fixed gear people come and buy trawl quota and put it into the fixed gear side. And that is hamstringing the Dover you’re going to get out of the water. Where you had 100% of the amount of black cod to prosecute your old fisheries, now you don’t have that, and it’s going to leave Dover, it’s going to leave other fisheries in the water. So I don’t think that that was right. I don’t think that they foresaw that.”
“Well, we had visions of starting markets for Dover on the East Coast using fresh trucks. Get a team driver, and get it there in two to three days. We talked to groups back there that were willing to take a look at it. We talked to a couple fishermen, and when it came time, they didn’t go fishing for Dover.”
“Black cod prices have gone up and down, but they’re [generally] higher. Petrale’s stable or higher. Our rockfish that we’re delivering has gone up higher. So all of it has definitely increased. And most of that is becasue there’s a lot of markets shoreside. I can go from port to port. I can go from fish plant to fish plant any time in the season I want. I can deliver to who I want. There’s competition, and as long as there’s competition, you’re going to get the price available for the fish.”
“I get up, catch the fish in the morning, and have it in in four hours, five hours. [A small outlet] cuts it, holds it, freezes it in the cooler for a day, and serves it out to people. And there’s a line all summer long trying to get to the door. It’s not just my fish. They buy fish off other boats. But I have basically an unlimited market for rock cod and lingcod. And I don’t get rich at it, but the limits are very small.”
“The larger processors see where under the right conditions, people can benefit from the ITQ program. They may not like the ITQ program, but they see under the right conditions where people can benefit from it. But it will require some changes in the program itself, which the council has been reluctant to make. On the accumulation limits, for example. There’s got to be some switching around, some loosening up of the limits, if for no other reason than to make boats more efficient so that they would be willing to provide fresh groundfish during the course of the year. There needs to be some willingness on the part of the boats to enter into cooperative agreements with processors. Under antitrust law, there is a limit to what the processors can do under a cooperative. But if the fishermen agree among themselves that they will all sell to X plant or X company, whatever, and the company agrees separately that yes, we will pay premium price during this time of year for this groundfish as long as it’s delivered in this fashion and so forth, yeah, there’s opportunities out there. So you sort of achieve the benefits of vertical integration without having vertical integration. But it requires true cooperation on the part of both the fisherman and the processor. And that is one of the downsides of having an independent fleet, is that everybody’s independent.”
“And so gradually it’s less and less and less money for the smaller boats. And so what’s happening is they’re retiring. They’re selling their quotas. It’s just basically put the small dragger out of business.”
“When you talk about big companies that use quota as a line on their ledger, whether it’s accessing more money from the bank or making the company worth more, you get a little bit different tune. It’s all about setting the quotas as high as you can set them and getting the most out of the resource, which is different than the Ma and Pop operations. And it’s part of the struggles I have been butting my head against.”
“I would say the biggest challenges for both whiting and non-whiting are all the archaic regulations that are still in place that should have gone away when we moved to an ITQ system. And so we were promised by the National Marine Fisheries Service that under an ITQ system you can fish where you want, when you want. You would have 100% observer coverage, but you would still have more flexibility and freedom. And while we do have some of that, we don’t have all the benefit of being fully rationalized. We still can’t fish in some areas because the rockfish conservation zones that were supposed to go away have not gone away. These were put in place to protect over-fished species, several of which have been rebuilt.”
“This whole thing was supposed to have 100% observer coverage on board, 100% accountability for the catch, a pound of quota for everything counted. Okay, fine. Let me go catch what I can catch. But they won’t do that. You still got all these closed areas. You still got all these gear restrictions that are ridiculous now. And why?”
“There are some people that absolutely hate this program, despise it, hate the observers. I’m on the other extreme. I think it’s a good program. We just need to fine-tune it, get rid of the old rules, bring the rules up to speed where we’re at now. I think the whole program is still very capable of being a very good program. It’s good for the ocean; there’s no doubt. And it’s for us too if we just get rid of the old frigging rules.”
“There have probably been some geographic shifts, like folks will say, “Well, there’s no whiting landed in California anymore,” and there used to be big production in Eureka. But that’s not a function of the ITQ program. That’s a function of where the fish are.”
“It’s not all bad. The good part is we can beach fish longer now. We can stay in shallower and fish the stuff that I’d rather fish longer, whereas under the old system we’d move out to the deep earlier. So that’s good. If you get nice weather for two months straight, you can fish every week for two months and bring in whatever the cannery wants of petrale, So that makes it more efficient.”
“Right now two months is all I groundfish. I’ll go get my petrale, my black cod, and what little Dover I get with those two species. And when I catch the petrale and black cod, I’m done. I’ve got 1.2 million lbs. of Dover sole, but I can’t catch that Dover because I’ve caught all my black cod.”
“We’ve seen quite a few changes. The one that comes to mind first off is vessel behavior. We were told that the IFQ fishery would lead to more opportunity for vessels to develop landing patterns to support the market, and in fact, it’s turned out 180 degrees opposite of that. Since they control the quota over the whole year and can fish at any time they want, they tend to pick the best opportunity in front of them at the time. Now we go through these intense periods of gluts and starvation. In a market that has a lot of substitute competition, notably from imports, it is very difficult to maintain your market base. And that has been a major factor in what I feel is a deterioration in our ability to market this fish.”
“Whiting being rationalized has been really beneficial to this fleet. As you probably see from the data, the whiting fishery, especially the shoreside fishery but I guess the same for the mothership sector, was a very short, derby, dangerous fishery that only lasted a couple of weeks. Now it starts May 15th and lasts through December 31st, so that gives folks the time to plan their activities around their other fisheries, whether it be bottom trawl or something up in Alaska and do it in a safe way at a time when it makes the most financial sense to do so.”
“I can go from port to port. I can go from fish plant to fish plant any time in the season I want. I can deliver to who I want. There’s competition, and as long as there’s competition, you’re going to get the price available for the fish.”
“If the abundance of a species isn’t recognized by the stock assessment, and you start running into a lot of it, then you got a problem.”
“This thing, it just inhibits and inhibits and inhibits. There’s no new opportunity developing here at all. They’ve taken black cod and allowed to be caught by pot boats. Sounds real good on the surface until you figure that black cod’s your biggest choke species for Dover. And then you double the Dover ACL. I mean honestly…”
“Lingcod has been declared rebuilt, but you can’t really target ling cod because ling cod and yellow-eye like the same kind of grounds. Canary rockfish is another very constraining species, extremely so. If a boat has 2,000 or 3,000 pounds of canaries in his quota, that’s a pretty decent quota, and he’s got to leave fish in the ocean because he can’t target them for fear of going over. Canary has become a very big bargaining chip late in the season. We’ve got increased numbers on our rockfish and ling cod, but you’ve got to be very, very careful. You can put yourself out of business from one day to the next if you’re not careful.”
“The problem is the initial investment in resources from private foundations as well as from agencies is to get [catch share programs] in, and then a lot of that support goes away, and the fleet is left struggling with a lot of things that the support could actual be helpful in. For instance, now that we’re in an ITQ program, you can catch species with different kinds of gear on your trawl quota. So if you have trawl quota, you can start working on alternative gear types and that can lead to higher value in those products. Yeah, but here’s the catch; there’s really no easy identified funding source to help the fleet to do that. And I see that as a huge problem because it’s like, oh, this is great, you can get more value. There’s no mechanism for them to actually do that.”
“Those who were smart enough to acquire permits and acquire black cod to go with their fixed gear permits are making good money on it. Black cod tends to be a higher value species, and pot and longline-caught black cod tends to be higher in value than trawl black cod. There’s a bunch of fisherman up in Ilwaco that were smart enough to recognize what was coming, and they went and they acquired trawl permits and were able to buy the black cod and do the gear-switching or trade it around amongst other fisherman and so forth.”
“So I don’t know about excessive consolidation. I don’t think that that’s been borne out. Like the problems with getting fish out of the water, some might say, “Well, because there are less boats” or whatever, and that’s not the case. There are enough boats to catch the fish. It’s just all these other regulations keeping people from getting the fish in my opinion.”
Baseline: Before Catch Share Program
Landings of non-whiting groundfish in the trawl fishery decreased steadily from the 1980s until around 2001, when they stabilized at approximately 20,000 mt. Total non-whiting groundfish landings during the 2002–2010 period were about 27 percent of the landings during 1981–1989. In contrast, shorebased Pacific whiting landings during the 2002–2010 period were more than sixty times what domestic landings were in 1981–1985 and accounted for the vast majority of trawl vessel groundfish landings by weight. Nevertheless, non-whiting groundfish accounted for the majority of trawl vessel gross revenues throughout the baseline period (2002–2010) due to their higher per-unit value (Financial Viability of the Fishery: Revenues).
The reductions in non-whiting groundfish landings were partially the result of increasingly restrictive management measures implemented by the Pacific Fishery Management Council. These measures, which were aimed at rebuilding overfished stocks, included reduced trip limits, area closures, and gear restrictions (Management Framework), and they resulted in lower harvests for both overfished and co-occurring species. Additionally, some groundfish stocks, whether overfished or not, may have experienced declines in biomass in the 1980s and 1990s due to a period of reduced productivity of the California Current (History of the Fishery).
The species composition and total volume of the non-whiting groundfish harvest changed over time. Rockfish landings during the 2002–2010 period were only about 7 percent of the landings during 1981–1985. Historically, rockfish were an important component of trawl fishery landings. But rockfish harvests declined due to decreasing abundance of several rockfish species (e.g., darkblotched rockfish, canary rockfish, and bocaccio) and regulations enacted to protect the depleted stocks (Management Framework). Moreover, opportunities to harvest healthier rockfish stocks (e.g., yellowtail and chilipepper rockfish) were substantially limited because of their relatively high degree of co-occurrence with overfished species. Harvests of flatfish, such as arrowtooth flounder and petrale sole, as well as some types of non-whiting roundfish, most notably sablefish, increased in economic importance as fishermen diverted their fishing effort from rockfish to other groundfish species. However, landings of some roundfish decreased substantially. In particular, a decline in lingcod catches occurred as a result of overfishing, as well as restrictive management measures intended to foster a rebuilding of depressed rockfish stocks that are caught in conjunction with lingcod.
While total non-whiting groundfish landings by the trawl fleet declined, harvests by the shorebased Pacific whiting sector grew, especially through the 1990s. A marked increase in 1994 resulted from a new stock assessment based on an expanded and improved survey. In 2002 and 2003, harvests of Pacific whiting were restricted based on highly variable stock assessment results. Catches rebounded following removal of the stock from its overfished status, but they declined in the late 2000s when stock assessments showed a decreasing abundance and allocations were reduced. In addition, NMFS temporarily closed the Pacific whiting fishery in 2008 in order to keep the bycatch of overfished species within limits.
During Catch Share Program
Over the first five years of the Shorebased IFQ Program, landings of non-whiting groundfish were relatively stable despite a substantial reduction in fleet size (Number of Active Vessels). Average annual landings were about 18,000 mt, which is around 90 percent of the average during the baseline (2002-2010). This stability suggest that vessels which were idled following catch share program implementation tended to be less productive, and consolidation of fishing activity primarily occurred among the most productive vessels.
Since the implementation of the catch share program some target non-whiting groundfish, such as petrale sole and sablefish north of 36° N. latitude, have had high ACL attainment rates. On average, however, the non-whiting groundfish fishery has been unable to land more than about one-third of its annual allowable harvest (Ratio of Catch to Quota). In 2015, the attainment level was only 21 percent.
Decreases in attainment have been partially driven by recent increases in the ACLs for some target non-whiting groundfish species (Annual Catch Limits). Current allocations for a number of species are higher than the historical catch within the non-whiting groundfish trawl fishery. For example, the highest landings of Dover sole occurred in 1996 (12,000 mt), and a second peak nearly as high occurred in 2009. These peaks, however, were still only about 26 percent of the 2015 Dover sole ACL (46,986 mt).
A second reason for the low overall attainment rate are the complex, often interrelated, factors that have created barriers and disincentives to achieving higher levels of fishermen participation in the non-whiting groundfish fishery. Some of these factors are discussed below, together with government and industry initiatives to improve ACL attainment rates.
Low attainment has been perpetuated by market factors (demand and price) caused by inconsistent supply. Changes in the temporal distribution of fishing effort related to implementation of the Shorebased IFQ Program have exacerbated problems related to the stability and reliability of non-whiting groundfish landings. With the move from bimonthly cumulative trip limits to individual fishing quotas, vessels have more flexibility in choosing when to participate in the groundfish fishery, and the harvester/processor coordination required to maintain a consistent supply has not occurred. The number of fishing trips and number of days an individual processor receives deliveries have generally decreased, while the average delivery size has increased (Average/Total Days at Sea and Delivery Size ). The average non-whiting groundfish vessel decreased its days at sea in the groundfish fishery from 67 to 51 days, or 24 percent, after the catch share program was implemented. Without a predictable supply, buyers and processors have a difficult time securing premium retail markets for non-whiting groundfish (Financial Viability of the Fishery: Revenues), which can create a self-reinforcing cycle: lower prices make fishing for non-whiting groundfish less profitable in comparison to other fisheries (Fishery Diversification) and result in fewer participants in the fishery, fewer trips per vessel, lower overall landings, and ultimately, low ACL attainment rates.
Fishing to avoid constraining species has likely decreased ACL attainment for some target species. Non-whiting groundfish stocks that are overfished and managed under rebuilding plans have low ACLs. The most severe example is yelloweye rockfish, which had a total allocation of only 1,323 quota pounds (QP) in 2011 and a median QP allocation of only 4 pounds. Moreover, allocations were unevenly distributed across quota holders (Access and Exclusion Effects). During the first five years of the program catches of overfished species were far below the total QP allocated for those species (Ratio of Catch to Quota). However, these catches tend to be uneven, and some fishermen caught more than the QP they were originally allocated and had to obtain additional QP, which can be expensive or difficult to find (Access and Exclusion Effects and Cost of Fishery Management: Private).
A number of fishermen may have chosen to forego a portion of their potential yield of target species in order to avoid harvesting co-occurring overfished species for which they had little or no quota. In particular, the threat of a “lightning strike” catch event in which a single tow puts a vessel over the annual vessel limit for that species encourages fishermen to be risk-averse in their fishing location choices. Even though a vessel might be able to find enough available QP on the market to cover its deficit, it still might not be able to fish for multiple years because catch share program regulations limit the amount of QP that can be transferred to a vessel account (Shorebased IFQ Program). One such lightning strike occurred in 2015, when a vessel using midwater trawl gear to harvest non-whiting groundfish inadvertently caught 47,000 pounds of canary rockfish.
As overfished species rebuild and become more abundant, the risk of an unexpected catch increases, further encouraging conservative fishing behavior that is likely to decrease the ACL attainment rate for target species. The infrequency of stock assessments and the slow speed at which new assessments enter the management system constrains the alignment of ACLs to biomass conditions. For example the 2014 stock assessment for canary rockfish shows that the stock is rebuilt; however, due to the two-year harvest specification cycle, the ACL for the species didn’t increase until 2017 (the 2017 ACL increased more than five times what it was in 2016) (Annual Catch Limits).
Other stocks are not overfished but may still constrain some harvesters in the non-whiting groundfish fishery given the high demand for quota. For example, some non-whiting groundfish fishermen feel that, as a result of the acquisition of leased limited entry trawl permits by fishermen who primarily participated in the limited entry fixed gear sablefish fishery prior to implementation of the catch share program (Financial Viability of the Fishery: Revenues), accessing sablefish QP became more difficult, which, in turn, hampered their ability to catch their quota of deep-water target species that co-occur with sablefish, such as Dover sole and thornyheads. However, an analysis in the NMFS Five-year Review of the catch share program shows that, while acquisition of sablefish QP by the fixed gear fishery depressed catches of co-occurring species, full utilization of those species was not likely during the first years of the catch share program, especially after the ACLs for both Dover sole and thornyheads increased substantially in 2015.
When the Shorebased IFQ Program was developed it was expected that the program would increase harvest and efficiency sufficiently and early enough that fishermen would be able to handle the increased costs of the program. Current data show that average annual vessel revenue and variable cost net revenue have increased since implementation of the program (Financial Viability of the Fishery: Revenues). However, the costs of observer and catch monitor coverage, cost recovery fees, and quota acquisition (Cost of Fishery Management: Private), together with the complexity of operating in the non-whiting groundfish fishery, have deterred participation in the fishery and have provided a disincentive to the consistent effort that would translate to a steady market supply and higher ACL attainment rates. Also, non-whiting groundfish vessels are still under many of the same gear restrictions and time/area closures that existed prior to 2011. These regulations limit access to healthy stocks and contribute to higher operating costs.
Government and Industry Initiatives to Improve ACL Attainment Rates
To help alleviate the constraining species problem, the Council and NMFS implemented a new management tool in 2017, whereby specific amounts of yield that are deducted from the ACLs for canary rockfish, darkblotched rockfish, and Pacific Ocean perch, to account for in-season unforeseen catch events. The Council determines the distribution of all or part of this “emergency buffer.”
Over time, the constraining species problem is expected to be further alleviated if the current trend of increasing ACLs of former overfished species continues. For example, the 2017 ACLs for many rockfish species such as canary and widow rockfish, formerly listed as overfished, increased more than five times what they were in 2016. As noted above, however, improvements in the speed of ACL adjustments are also needed. The Council and NMFS has been using the exempted fishing permit (EFP) program as a temporary fix to get past the slow-moving regulatory process. Since the catch share began, EFPs have been issued to many non-whiting groundfish vessels to test various types of alternative fishing gear, with the objective of increasing ACL attainment rates. In 2017, for example, more than 30 vessels applied for an EFP that would exempt them from the requirement to use selective flatfish trawl gear shoreward of the Rockfish Conservation Area (RCA) north of 40 degrees 10′ N. latitude in order to re-establish targeted fisheries for widow, yellowtail, and chilipepper rockfish as the ACLs for those species increase.
In addition, in 2014, NMFS revised the boundaries of the RCAs to facilitate the harvest of several underutilized target groundfish species, while still protecting overfished species. The individual accountability of the catch shares program supported these modifications to the RCAs by reducing the harvest of overfished species (Ratio of Catch to Quota). Moreover, the advent of precise, near real-time data in the NMFS online vessel account system enables a quick protective response should a species show signs of depletion (Shorebased IFQ Program).
One way in which industry has helped alleviate the constraining species problem is by organizing quota risk pools whereby groups of fishermen collectively manage the risk associated with the catch of overfished species. This strategy provides fishermen with a level of security that allows them to pursue high-risk target species. One such risk pool is the California Groundfish Collective, which is made up of fishing associations from Fort Bragg, Half Moon Bay, and Morro Bay. Collective members fish in accordance to an agreed upon spatial fishing plan that includes voluntary closures in high risk areas and precautionary fishing (e.g., shorter tows) in moderate risk areas, and they agree to share information on overfished species encounters through an electronic logbooks system. From 2011 to 2014, the Collective’s ratio of overfished species catch to target species catch was substantially less than the rest of the non-whiting IFQ fleet (Ratio of Overfished Species to Target Species ). It was higher in 2015 due mainly to increased harvest of bocaccio rockfish (bocaccio was declared rebuilt in 2017).
Despite the potential benefits, however, relatively few fishermen have opted to organize formal risk pools. The California Groundfish Collective has had 10 to 12 member vessels, and in 2015, collectively managed only about 12 percent of the total overfished IFQ species QP. Among the possible factors that discourages risk pool formation is the high cost of negotiating and maintaining legally binding contractual agreements among members.
Industry has also used gear diversification to increase ACL attainment rates. Under the catch share program’s gear switching provision (Shorebased IFQ Program), non-whiting groundfish fishermen were able to alleviate the constraining species problem by using use pot and hook-and-line gear to target sablefish, together with nearshore rockfish and thornyheads (Landings with Fixed Gear ). These fixed gears are not only more selective than trawl gear, they also catch larger sablefish that bring a higher ex-vessel price per pound (Financial Viability of the Fishery: Revenues). Most vessels that have taken advantage of this ability to use any legal groundfish gear in the IFQ fishery primarily participated in the limited entry fixed gear sablefish fishery prior to 2011, but then leased trawl permits after the catch share program began in order to acquire quota for IFQ sablefish (Financial Viability of the Fishery: Revenues). A measure developed by the Council and NMFS in 2016 that allows participants in the Shorebased IFQ Program to register a trawl permit and fixed gear permit to their vessel at the same time is expected to facilitate the expansion into the IFQ fishery of vessels that use only fixed gear.
The conversion to fixed gear contributed to an attainment rate for northern sablefish that stayed above 85 percent from 2011 to 2015 (Ratio of Catch to Quota). However, a confluence of factors has depressed the attainment rate for sablefish south of 36° N. lat., which was highest in the first year of the catch share program (84 percent) but has averaged 26 percent since then. Sablefish price dropped sharply after 2011, although the species remains the West Coast’s most valuable groundfish per pound (Financial Viability of the Fishery: Revenues). Another factor was that the easily accessible inshore fishing grounds for southern sablefish were heavily exploited, leaving only grounds far offshore that were challenging and costly to fish. Finally, the southern sablefish ACL increased from 1.13 million pounds in 2012 to 1.59 million pounds in 2015 (Annual Catch Limits), but the number of vessels fishing for IFQ southern sablefish decreased from 12 in 2011 to 8 in 2014 and 2015.
A second major instance of gear diversification since implementation of the Shorebased IFQ Program was the adoption by some non-whiting groundfish vessels of midwater trawl gear to increase their harvest of rockfish that display off-bottom schooling behavior, such as widow and yellowtail (Landings with Midwater Trawl Gear ). In addition to allowing fishermen to switch from bottom trawling to midwater trawling, the catch share program eliminated the trip limits that restricted widow and yellowtail retention to those vessels harvesting Pacific whiting during the primary whiting season. In order to target any species with midwater gear, a vessel currently only needs to acquire sufficient QP to cover its catch, although fishing may only occur during the dates of the primary whiting season. Authorized midwater gear types have demonstrated that built-in mechanisms for keeping fishing gear off the bottom minimize the catch of overfished yelloweye rockfish while allowing harvest levels adequate to support a fishery. The number of non-whiting groundfish vessels using midwater trawl gear increased from four in 2011 to 14 in 2015.
Public-private partnerships such as the Groundfish Markets Development Initiative are attempting to increase ACL attainment rates by aligning fishing effort and product availability with market demand through coordination between fishermen and buyers, securing buyers serving various sizes and locations of fishing operations, and overseeing groundfish marketing and promotional campaigns (Financial Viability of the Fishery: Revenues).
Shorebased Pacific Whiting Fishery
Average annual landings of shorebased Pacific whiting during 2011-2015 were about 21 percent higher than the 2002-2010 average due to strong year classes that resulted in high ACLs. The high landings despite a downward trend in fleet size (Number of Active Vessels) suggest that the less productive vessels exited the fishery.
The proportion of the shorebased Pacific whiting allocation harvested was high during the first years of the Shorebased IFQ Program, although it fell slightly in 2012 due to the re-apportionment of surplus Pacific whiting from the tribal sector to commercial sectors made late in the year, which increased the allocation by about 5 percent. The attainment rate was again high (99 percent) in 2013. However, it dropped to 83 percent in 2014 and to 47 percent in 2015 due to a combination of especially high allocations (Ratio of Catch to Quota and Annual Catch Limits), weak markets (Financial Viability of the Fishery: Revenues), and low catch rates that may have been caused by anomalous oceanographic conditions. A comparison of shorebased Pacific whiting landings in pre-catch share years (2005 to 2010) to those in catch share years (2011 to 2015) shows that effort in the fishery has shifted to later in the year. The increased flexibility in fishing operations provided by the Shorebased IFQ program allows fishermen the opportunity to delay the start of their season to target larger, higher-priced fish.
In 2012, the Shorebased Whiting Cooperative was formed to manage bycatch of overfished rockfish species during the harvest of shorebased Pacific whiting. As with the non-whiting groundfish vessel risk pools, members agree to abide to cautionary and closed area rules and requirements for data sharing. Seventeen shorebased whiting vessels currently participate in the Cooperative.
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National Marine Fisheries Service. 2017a. West Coast Groundfish Trawl Catch Share Program Five-year Review – Draft. Pacific Fishery Management Council. Portland, OR.
National Marine Fisheries Service. 2017b. FISHeries Economics Explorer (FISHEyE). Available online: https://dataexplorer.northwestscience.fisheries.noaa.gov/fisheye/.
Northern Economics, Inc. 2011. Collective arrangements for managing constraining species risk in the West Coast groundfish trawl fishery. Prepared for Environmental Defense Fund.
Pacific Fishery Management Council and National Marine Fisheries Service. 2010. Rationalization of the Pacific Coast Groundfish Limited Entry Trawl Fishery; Final Environmental Impact Statement Including Regulatory Impact Review and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. Portland, OR.
Pacific Fisheries Information Network (PacFIN). 2013. PFMC Groundfish Management Team Reports, PacificStates Marine Fisheries Commission. Available online: http://pacfin.psmfc.org/pacfin_pub/pfmc.php.
Somers, K, Y. Lee, J. Jannot, C. Whitmire, V. Tuttle, and J. McVeigh. 2017. Fishing Effort in the 2002-20 U.S. Pacific Coast Groundfish Fisheries. National Marine Fisheries Service Northwest Fisheries Science Center. Seattle, WA.
Changing Tastes and Wilderness Markets. 2015. West Coast Groundfish Regional Market Demand and Opportunities. Washington, D.C.
Updated: May 2018
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